

limited nuclear test-ban treaty. He had backed such proposals since his years as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the Eisenhower administration.

Nevertheless, because of his desire that the facts should be known as fully as possible, he furnished a CIA staff expert to assist Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of an armed services subcommittee and an opponent of the treaty. This angered the White House and the State Department, but it was consistent with McCone's views of the CIA's role in informing the government as fully as possible.

In his own testimony at Senate hearings, he confined himself to technical information and down-the-line support of the Kennedy administration's policy.

IT IS THIS KIND of intellectual effort to separate fact from fancy, evidence from suspicion, decision from preference, opinion from policy and consequence from guess that effective control of the CIA must begin, in the opinion of most of those who have been surveyed by the New York Times.

And it is when these qualities have been lacking, the same officials and experts believe, that the CIA most often has become involved in those activities that have led to widespread charges that it is not controlled, makes its own policy and undermines that of its political masters.

Inevitably, the contrast is drawn between John McCone and Allen W. Dulles, one of the most charming and imaginative men in Washington, under whose direction the CIA grew to its present proportions and importance.

AS LONG as his brother, John Foster Dulles, was secretary of state, Allen Dulles had no need to chafe under political "control." The secretary had an almost equal fascination for devious adventure in the back alleys of what he saw as a world-wide crusade.

Neither brother earned his high reputation by taut and business administration. Both placed supreme confidence in their personal judgments.

Allen Dulles was also an accomplished politician. Throughout his regime he maintained the best of relations with the late Clarence Cannon of Mis-

souri, who as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee was the key figure in providing CIA funds.

DULLES KEPT personal control of the selection of other members of Congress with responsibility for overseeing the CIA, with the result that he invariably had on his side those members of the congressional establishment who could carry the rest of Congress with them.

Thus, in the Dulles period at the CIA, there was a peculiar set of circumstances. An adventurous director, inclined to rely on his own extremely good and informed intuition, widely traveled, read and experienced, with great prestige and the best connections in Congress, whose brother held the second-highest office in the administration, and whose President completely trusted and relied upon both, was enabled to act almost at will and was shielded from any unpleasant consequences.

DULLES'S continuance in office by the Kennedy administration set the stage for the Bay of Pigs and the great crisis of the CIA.

In that incredible drama of 1961, it was Dulles's weaknesses as CIA director—rather than, as so often before, his strengths—that came to the fore. He was committed to the Cuba invasion plan, at all costs, against whatever objections. The advocate overcame the planner.

As President Kennedy and others interposed reservations and qualifications, Dulles and his chief lieutenant, Richard M. Bissell, made whatever changes were required in order to keep the plan alive. For instance, they switched the landing site from the Trinidad area to the Bay of Pigs, to achieve more secrecy, thereby accepting an inferior beachhead site and separating the refugee force of invaders from the Escambray Mountains, where they were supposed to operate as guer-

illas, by 80 miles of swamp. ABOVE ALL, lacking his old rapport with President Eisenhower and his brother, lacking a coldly objective approach to his plan, Dulles never realized that President Kennedy suffered from more than tactical reservations.

These misgivings—in reality a reluctance to approve the invasion—forced the frequent changes in plans, each weakening the whole, until whatever chance of success there might have been was gone.

It was John McCone who replaced Allen Dulles at the CIA's most critical hour. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it had barely escaped dismemberment, or at least the divorce of its intelligence and operations divisions. There were also new cries for greater control, and the men around President Kennedy were suspicious of, if not hostile to, the agency.

LIKE DULLES, McCone devoted much energy to resisting a formal congressional watchdog committee, to courting the senior members of the armed services, and appropriations committees on Capitol Hill and to converting the members of a resuscitated presidential advisory board to his view of intelligence policies.

But those who observed him work believe he also brought a keen intelligence and energy to a tough-minded administration of the agency itself and to careful, challenging study of its intelligence estimates and recommendations.

He broke down the rigid division between operations and analysis that had kept the CIA's analysts—incredible as it seems—ignorant of the operations division's specific plan to invade Cuba. And he began to subject the CIA's own action programs to vigorous review and criticism by the agency's own experts.

THE INTELLECTUAL level of meetings among intelligence officials at the CIA and other

agencies improved greatly under McCone. Primarily because he put difficult and incisive questions to those preparing formal analyses and plans, forcing them to challenge and defend their own judgments.

He brought specialists and experts into conferences and decision-making at a much higher level of policy than before. Often he took such men with him to meetings at the cabinet level. This exposed them to policy considerations as never before, and put policy-makers more closely in touch with the experts on whose "facts" they were acting.

AS CHAIRMAN of the U.S. Intelligence Board—a group that brings together representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's intelligence unit and others—McCone won a reputation for objectivity by frequently overruling the proposals of his own agency, the CIA.

His regime was not without its critics. Many officials believe he narrowed the CIA's range of interests, which was as wide as the horizons under the imaginative Allen Dulles. For instance, they say, he was slow to mobilize the CIA to obtain information about nuclear programs in India, Israel and other nations.

McCone also tried, but failed, to end interagency rivalries.

